Great Circle Associates Firewalls
(August 1994)
 

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Subject: Re: Screening & routers
From: sgcccdc @ citec . qld . gov . au (Colin Campbell)
Date: Wed, 3 Aug 94 10:01:18 EST
To: mulligan @ future . Eng . Sun . COM (Geoff Mulligan)
Cc: Firewalls @ GreatCircle . COM
In-reply-to: <9408022156 . AA02000 @ future . Eng . Sun . COM>; from "Geoff Mulligan" at Aug 2, 94 2:56 pm

> 
> >  Problem is that now a cracker just needs to subvert the "Bastion host" which
> >  is visible to the outside. If this is done, the screening router will permit
> >  the traffic, thus creating a "single point vulnerability". With the router 
> >  first, both need to be subverted particularly if the basion uses aliases.
> 
> The problem either way is that cracker just needs to subvert the bastion
> host.  Even with a screening router the bastion host is visible to the
> outside world, or it wouldn't be reachable.  I'm not convinced that
> putting the bastion host inside the screening router is better and I
> think that it may in fact be worse.
> 

BUT ... the external screening router is used to filter out everything
except that which is desired - eg only permits certain ports < 1024
(news,mail,dns,...) and established connections > 1023.  I've probably
forgotten some, but you get the picture. That way you have some control
over what actually reaches the bastion. That is also why it is called a
`screening' router - it is filtering out all the unwanted traffic.

Colin



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