Thus spake Doug Hughes:
> It becomes readily apparent that Java may in fact be free from
> program correctness flaws, but it isn't at all aparent that it is
> free from other security flaws. The main problem I see, over and
> over again, is that all the security is user configurable.
Well, you could always write your own SecurityManager.class (talk to
Anselm Baird-Smith... he's working on one right now) to drop into the
appropriate directory and then have the security hard-configured.
(I don't think there's a security-config option relating to Java in
Netscape 2.0b, so I'll assume we're talking about HotJava. Actually,
there might be something in the .INI... should check that out.)
> It still sounds easily subverted via social engineering.
If you allow outbound TCP, you're wide open for someone to distribute
a Netscape plug-in, or a new version of ws_ftp, or what have you, and
have it do nasty things security-leak-wise.
OK, let's assume that Java(tm) really is a Bad Thing. What are you
going to do about it? It's out there, and if you can't trust your
users to listen to your policy about "no Java!", then you can't keep
it from getting in. And if you _can_ trust them to listen to you,
then you can solve this with policy.
#> Mike Shaver (shaver @
com) Ingenia Communications Corporation <#
#> UNIX medicine man -- dark magick, cheap! <#
#> When the going gets tough, the tough give cryptic error messages. <#
#> "We believe in rough consensus and running code." <#