Great Circle Associates Firewalls
(November 1995)
 

Indexed By Date: [Previous] [Next] Indexed By Thread: [Previous] [Next]

Subject: Re: Vendor Product Access
From: frankw @ in . net (Frank Willoughby)
Date: Mon, 13 Nov 95 22:36:58 -0500
To: "TMOONEY.UMI.COM" <TMOONEY @ umi . com>
Cc: firewalls @ GreatCircle . com

>
> 
>A vendor of an on-line database asks that we open our firewall to their
entire  
>Class B address space for both UDP and TCP on ports 8000 thru 9120.   
>  
>I have been asked to quantify the risks involved. My initial list includes:  
>  
>Why do they need their entire Class B? This allows ANYONE in their domain  
>access.  
>  
>Why do they want 1120 ports of both UDP or TCP? This seems a little large to  
>me.  
>  
>Any words of wisdom from admins "who have been there" that I can use to  
>bolster my initial "This is a BAD IDEA" reaction to upper management would be  
>appreciated.  
>  
>Thanks,  
>Tom Mooney  
>Senior UNIX System Administrator 
>  
>
>
>
>
>


Tom,

Mildly putting it - "They are out of their minds" (although you may
want to rephrase this to be somewhat more diplomatic).  A connection 
between their database & your internal LAN/WAN through your firewall 
configured as you mentioned puts your internal LAN/WAN at a serious risk.  

Assuming you have no other choice in matter & your manager says make
the connection or find another job, there are almost always alternatives
to ugly situations:

1) Send a mail (cc: to yourself and at least one other trustworthy person) 
   indicating the risks and your disapproval of the connection.  Print out 
   the mail, sign & date it, and mail it to your home address.  Take the 
   unopened envelope and file it away for safekeeping (you may need it if 
   anything ever happens).

2) Find a way to minimize the risk (& hope for the best).

There are a few ways of minimizing the risk, but the least risky one
that comes to mind right now (10pm) is to have the connection tied
to an isolated network segment (ie - isolated = not connected to any
other networks, all network connections taped up, etc.) where the 
db info is accessed and transferred via sneakernet to your internal
LAN/WAN.  This segment can be protected by your outside router or a
firewall with subnetting capability.  (If you decide to go this route,
make *Very* sure you are very careful about setting up your rules.)
Triple-check your work and then have a second person confirm your 
configuration is correct.

If you want a long song & dance on the risks of what they are proposing,
either grab a copy of Cheswick & Bellovin's wonderful book entitled 
"Firewalls & Internet Security" or send me a mail.

The above comes from my experience in a previous life as a National 
Information Security Operations Officer for a major high-tech company
where I have had to handle similar problems as the one you posed.  
(Some were actually pretty bizarre, but that's another story...)

Best Regards,


Frank

PS - If you need any more help on this, drop me a line with your phone
     number & I will try to help you more.

Fortified Networks Inc.
http://www.fortified.com/fortified


 
Fortified Networks Inc.
http://www.fortified.com/fortified

Expert Management & Information Security Consulting

<standard disclaimer>
The opinions expressed above are of the author and may not 
necessarily be representative of Fortified Networks Inc.


Indexed By Date Previous: Re: Vendor Product Access
From: Alan Hannan <alan @ gi . net>
Next: Security setup
From: j . favia @ olibari . ico . olivetti . com (Joseph Favia)
Indexed By Thread Previous: Re: Vendor Product Access
From: Paul Ferguson <pferguso @ cisco . com>
Next: Re: Vendor Product Access
From: janken @ rust . net (Kenneth J. Stephens)

Google
 
Search Internet Search www.greatcircle.com