Great Circle Associates Firewalls
(November 1995)
 

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Subject: Re: 3 firewalls broken into?
From: Brain21 <brain21 @ montag33 . residence . gatech . edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 1995 15:05:31 -0500 (EST)
To: dharter @ taz . dra . hmg . gb
Cc: firewalls @ GreatCircle . COM
In-reply-to: <199511291033 . CAA22011 @ miles . greatcircle . com>

On Wed, 29 Nov 1995 Darren .
 Harter @
 GreatCircle .
 COM wrote:

> There's one other potential threat: NTP.  It is feasable to perform a 
> denial of service attack on an HHA system by modifying the 
> time on the HHA server via NTP.  I'm not an expert on NTP, so please 
> no flames, but I've seen sites that perform time updates without 
> using keys (and relying on IP Address), which would leave them vulnerable
> to this type of attack. Of course, this would work for any application that
> relies on accurate/syncronised clocks, but we can't all be stratus-1 servers 
> can we ;-)
> 
Along the same lines...

I believe that the SecurID server looks through a +/- 3 minute window.  
IOW, if the SecurID card is set to change it's token every minute, and 
the server does not see the correct token right away, it looks in a 3 
minute window for THAT token, and *then* sychs up the clocks.  If it is 
outside of that 3 minute window it looks into a +/- 10 minute window.  IF 
it is in the +/- 10 minute window, then the server will issue another 
challenge to the card.  Is this correct so far? (This is what some folks 
at Gandalf told me, anyway).  The token is transmitted to the server in 
the clear, and is therefore snoopable is the server is not on it's own 
subnet.  A hacker then has the token and has a window of time in which to 
use it.  If they can alter te NTP protocol on the server then they can 
use the ID at anytime.  My question is this; Are the Tokens 1 time only? 
(IOW will playing w/ NTP NOT allow you to use the token over and over 
again, even if the server thinks that that token could not have been used 
yet because of the time?)  How secure is the card itself?  Hackers have 
broken Europe's DSS by hacking the access cards' PROMs and cloning them.  
How hard would this be to do w/ SecurID (IOW, is it possible to get a 
hold of someone's SecureID card for a few minutes to clone it, 
technically)?   Why are the tokens submitted in the clear?  Why is there 
not some sort of transparent key exchange going on BEFORE the tokens are 
sent?

Just wondering,

Brain21


References:
Indexed By Date Previous: Re: SDI's Time-Synched SecurIDs (3 of 3)
From: "william.wells" <william . wells @ damark . com>
Next: Re: A1 Systems?
From: "K Goertzel" <goertzek @ gateway . wangfed . com>
Indexed By Thread Previous: Re: 3 firewalls broken into?
From: nreadwin @ london . micrognosis . com (Neil Readwin)
Next: Re: 3 firewalls broken into?
From: sgcccdc @ citec . qld . gov . au (Colin Campbell)

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