Great Circle Associates Firewalls
(March 1996)
 

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Subject: Re: firewalls and CKE
From: Ian Johnstone-Bryden <ianj-b @ dial . pipex . com>
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 96 12:20:58 GMT
To: Firewall List <firewalls @ GreatCircle . COM>
In-reply-to: <m0u1iKo-001AeRC @ csc . com>
References: Conversation <m0u1iKo-001AeRC @ csc . com> with last message <m0u1iKo-001AeRC @ csc . com>

Adam wrote:
> I think the point of key escrow is for Big Brother to be able to easily 
Tap
> (i.e. monitor not dance with)  computer communications.    It's all 
because
> of the budget cuts and new government productivity requirements.
> 
> With nice key escrow they can dance -outside- the building, possibly out 
of
> the rain in the local Telco-POP.   With appropriate working arrangements
> with your local ISP provider they could even sit in their own office in 
DC
> or wherever and have the traffic routed to them.  They don't need 
expensive
> Crays but can use PC's, possibly with dirty word search engines so they
> don't even need an operator.  
> 
> Note:  I DO NOT know this for a fact (I don't have any type of 
clearance).
> But if I were King that's what I would decree and if I can think of it 
I'm
> sure dimmer minds can too.....

Having an ability does not imply universal intent. In a democratic society 
we give up the right to anarchy in our self interest to seek protection 
from the wolves. If we dont like what an administration is doing we vote 
them out at the next election. Therefore we get the government we deserve 
even if we dont like it.

The police and intelligence services are only servants of the State. Like 
any group of people they want an easy life and given complete free range 
they may seek to prohibit or control anything that makes their job more 
difficult. Its the politicians task to control them and our task to control 
the politicians.

Having some form of policing agency holding encryption keys doesnt mean 
that they can use them widely. In reality the greatest challenge to 
intelligence services is the vast amount of information potentially 
available from an enormous range of sources. The result is that even 
totalitarian regimes have to be selective and democratic societies usually 
have under manned and under funded intelligence services, forcing them to 
be very selective.

One of the greatest risks is fear of risk. Therefore we should attempt to 
view in proportion. 

If you are a professional criminal intending to do something illegal you 
may not be affected by government agencies having access to encryption keys 
because you wont provide copies of the keys which you use and intelligence 
agencies understand that. You will know that unless other activities have 
caused you to be targeted for surveillance it is highly unlikely that 
anyone will realise that you are not using escrowed keys. Equally it is 
unlikely that a government agency will detect unencrypted traffic because 
there is just too much flowing.

The United States probably still maintains the largest intelligence and 
policing community in the world with some of the most sofisticated 
equipment available and with massive funding. They have enough difficulty 
analysing the imaging data collected by surveillance satellites without 
placing teams in every ISP provider to intercept and decode every packet 
that passes through.

What is most likely is that a Serious Crime Unit will target a suspected 
criminal. To do that they will have observed something which gives probable 
cause. It might be that an individual has frequent contact with someone who 
has already been targeted. The SCU then has to gather the maximum level of 
information possible. That means wire taps, video surveillance and all the 
other stuff including intercepting mail and email. In the process, the SCU 
may identify other parties which merit surveillance. Generally that process 
is controled by the need to obtain warrants from judges and other legal 
protections, but often the major constraint is resources. Even special 
units targeting major criminals just dont have the level of resource 
necessary to do their job adequately and never succeed in closing down the 
entire criminal network.

The main risk to those innocents who get sucked in to such an investigation 
is that policing agencies usually employ the same poor quality untrusted 
information systems that the rest of us use - sometimes their equipment is 
far worse than average because of budget constraints. As a result unwanted 
information does not get purged, print out ends up at rubbish dumps, 
someone else uses the information not understanding what it really is and 
how it got there, lack of effective risk policies allows police personnel 
to deliberately or accidentally forward data to some third party. 

For example there are cases where credit agencies acquired (illegally) 
police information which included the personal details of an innocent 
person who was then turned down for credit because of a 'police record'. 
These incidents are very very infrequent and represent such a small number 
that they are almost impossible to calculate statistically.

Therefore most network users have virtually no risk from using encrypted 
packets where the keys are escrowed. OTOH they may have significantly 
reduced the risks of their data being intercepted by criminals and 
competitors.

We probably need much greater control on the use made by governments of 
personal and corporate data however it was obtained but the widest abuses 
of data are generally by commercial enterprises except for those 
governments which have a reputation for widespread civil liberties abuse, 
but then they wont mind using other much more painfull techniques to obtain 
any information from you which they think they might need.

What we probably also need is more effective international agreement and 
that will be difficult to gain. One factor is that what one person may 
regard as unacceptable may be welcomed by another.

For example, a US citizen might be pleased that his government has 
intercepted a trade secret from a French corporation and passed the details 
to a US competitor to win a contract for US industry. A French citizen 
however might well be extremely upset. That type of intelligence gathering 
does happen and is increasing because many intelligence services have spare 
capacity as a result of changes in international politics. 

However, the greater danger is that private intelligence services are 
becoming more numerous and better equipped, sometimes employing government 
intelligence personnel made redundant by reduced East-West tensions. In 
that situation, there is lower risk in having legal access to encryption 
products to protect corporate and personal data with escrowed keys, than 
not having effective encryption.

Perhaps what we should be doing is encouraging governments to reach 
international agreement and ensure that any escrowed keys are adequately 
protected under law by the escrow agency. 

Looking at the approach of a number of governments, the key escrow is not 
designed to place keys with active police or intelligence agencies except 
for keys used by government agencies. Some proposals allow for the Key 
Certification Authority to be a licensed commercial enterprise. That would 
require any government agency to go through legal controls to obtain a key 
to open intercepted traffic just as for wire taping and opening letters - 
they certainly wouldnt be lurking in POPs with a bag full of keys to open 
every encrypted packet which passes.
Ian J-B




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