Bernd Eckenfels wrote:
| > Topics dealt with in the paper include:
| > . Race attacks based upon fixed length responses (still valid even with
| > the current patch)
| > . Denial of Service attacks based upon server patches
| > . Server - Slave separation and replay attacks
| > . Vulnerabilities in the communications with the ACE Server
| > . A quick analysis of the communications with the ACE Server
| > . Problems with out-of-band authentication
|
| What about the Relationship between the Serial Number of a Card (or any
| other nformation printed on it) and the Seed of the PNG? How does a Admin
There is none. There are real problems, as Peiter points out.
This is not one of them.
| announce new Cards to the Ace Server? Is this a "keep it secret" thing, or
| is it cryptogrfically secure?
The card records (which include data on the seed) are des
encrypted, and only sent to the site contact at the appropriate
address. I've suggested PGP to them.
Adam
--
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
-Hume
References:
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