Jerry Huyghe wrote:
> This is generally a good idea, but is far from foolproof. Hackers have
> found ways to forge signatures on applets. For example, someone can create
> an applet and use a signature from a widely-trusted source. See Princeton's
> discovery of this at http://www.cs.princeton.edu/sip/news/april29.html
Putting JAR signature verification is not susceptible to this attack. It is not
possible for someone to create an applet and use a signature from another
"widely-trusted" source - the JAR format will not allow this. It is very
possible to build into an http proxy the code to validate a JAR and the
signatures that sign this JAR.
This attack is on the JVM and how it handles the trust model based on
signatures (as can be seen from your quote), not on the basic (though poorly
designed) JAR format.
> Quote
> "As a result, an unprivileged, but signed, applet can act as if it were
> signed by anybody. In particular, our applet will scan through your list of
> trusted signatures and impersonate one of them."
geoff
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