Great Circle Associates Firewalls
(February 1998)
 

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Subject: Re: anti-sniffer warfare
From: "Icore, Joshua" <jicore @ dsava . com>
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 1998 10:51:20 -0500
To: "Marc Heuse" <Marc . Heuse @ mail . DeuBa . COM>
Cc: "firewalls" <firewalls @ GreatCircle . COM>

> Hi,
> 
>> A more direct approach would be to run something like cpm from CERT.   cpm 
can  be run out of cron on unix boxes and checks to see which if any devices
>> are in  promiscuous mode by checking the devices status via ioctl's.
> 
> If an attacker finds this program he'll modify it so it won't
> report
> anything. This is almost trivial.

This is true of any host based software of course, but it is one step...
 
> A better approach for an attacker would be load a kernel module (if supported 
by the operating system) which does prevent showing the
> PROMISC flag from the ethernet card.

Agreed, also, the attacker would want to load a module to prevent the ethernet 
card from responding to frames that are not sent to its MAC address to prevent 
active detection by a remote host....

>> For the really paranoid, with source access, one can always wrap/trap the 
SIOCSIFFLAGS operation and check to see if IFF_PROMISC is being set, and
> issue a warning.
> 
> this would be a good solution. Someone would need to patch the system to get 
around this, and to detect this and remove the protection is a
> hard work, too much for most of the script kiddies. btw. linux reports a 
"kernel: eth0: Promiscuous mode enabled" ...

As do {Free,Net,Open}BSD

>> Since IFF_PROMISC is already resitricted on *nix systems to euid 0, add code 
to write to a log, or send mail if the IFF_PROMISC flag is set.
> 
> well - whats the use? If an attacker has got root to run a sniffer, he can 
too modify the logs. Solution: send a log message to another host.
> 				Marc Heuse

True, but the attacker can also disable syslog, add a static route and arp 
entry (if needed) for the log host to the localhost...The possibilities are 
endless...

Respectfully,
Joshua R. Icore

---
Joshua R. Icore

Network Security Engineer
Decision-Science Applications, Inc.
1110 N. Glebe Rd., Suite 400
Arlington, VA  22201

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