Great Circle Associates Firewalls
(January 1995)
 

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Subject: Re: IDENTD
From: hobbit @ bronze . lcs . mit . edu (*Hobbit*)
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 1995 18:56:36 -0500
To: firewalls @ greatcircle . com

> Spoofing one client connection is something; spoofing
> both client and IDENT connections should be considerably harder.

You could even wire the "known" client IDENTDs to return some magic
cookie instead of the username, and put "cookie @
 host" in your allow file.
The attacker who managed to spoof the identd lookup and jam in
"targetuser" instead of "cookie" would lose.

Still STO, but hey...

_H*


Indexed By Date Previous: Protection against sequence number guessing
From: "Henning Stams" <hstams @ k . mup . de>
Next: Re: login/password attacks (fwd)
From: Umesh_Reghuram @ notes . pw . com
Indexed By Thread Previous: Protection against sequence number guessing
From: "Henning Stams" <hstams @ k . mup . de>
Next: Test labs
From: padgett @ tccslr . dnet . mmc . com (A. Padgett Peterson, P.E. Information Security)

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