> ...and it doesn't butter your toast either.
Sarcasm noted. A quick defense of my position, then back to my request...
> And the sole protection of the non-transparent types is security by
> obscurity, which you can't count on. Superhacker would probably set up the
> first trojan horse to email back whatever information is needed, so that
> the second version could be tailored to complete the conquest.
I don't expect to keep superhacker out, and I don't expect to defend against
an inside job. Without someone on the inside, though, I wonder how superhacker
plans to figure out what the IP address of my telnet proxy is from whatever
his preprogrammed robot mails back to him. There's no standard script out
there for proxy telnet, and if he starts mailing en-mass copies of everyone's
.cshrc and .login and ~/bin in the hope of figuring it out that's going to
show up in the mail logs. And my mail service is through a completely separate
channel than my IP service, so looking at sendmail.cf isn't going to help.
I'm interested in keeping out the average hackers. If a non-transparent
proxy will keep out a carpet-bomb type broadcast attack, akin to the "virus"
threat on PCs, then it's a useful tool. If FW-1 has some mechanism that will
make this sort of thing harder, then that's useful too.
So, back to my request... what does FW-1 or any other filtering firewall do
that might be useful in countering this attack? If the answer's "you don't want
to counter that attack in your firewall" then I'll take that as "nothing, and
we're really defensive about it".
--
Peter da Silva `-_-'
Network Management Technology Incorporated 'U`
1601 Industrial Blvd. Sugar Land, TX 77478 USA
+1 713 274 5180 "Hast du Heute schon deinen Wolf umarmt?"
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