Great Circle Associates Firewalls
(June 1995)
 

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Subject: Re: Securing Web data.
From: Messages_Roswell @ oxy . com (Messages Roswell)
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 1995 16:58:28 -0500
To: Firewalls @ GreatCircle . COM, Brad Smith <brad @ cse . ucsc . edu>

     Brad,
     
     We are trying to address the same problem, however we have expanded a 
     little beyond you initial scope, we feel there is a need for the WWW 
     to interactively access internal databases.
     
     Our thoughts thus far: would like to discuss a model for running 
applications across the Internet, utilizing the world wide web.

We feel that in the near future (1-2) years, we will have a business 
need to allow outside access to 
certain specific internal data bases. This model would be able to 
address these needs through the common gateway interface (CGI) 
mechanism used in the http protocol, which is the  protocol used by the 
world wide web. This would allow for device independent client 
platforms (Windows, Mac, UNIX, OS/2, etc), while maintaining control at 
the server. The customer only need have access to the internet and have 
Web browser software (i.e. Spry, Netscape, etc).

We think this model would be sufficient to insure secure access to data 
behind our firewall. 

Currently we do not allow any inbound (from the internet side of the 
firewall) access to an internal web server. This model would not change 
that. In fact, the current proposal for a web server, is to place a web 
server on the outside segment of the firewall (see diagram 1).



                                 Diagram 1:   Current Firewall 

The model We would propose is that the outside web server would utilize 
CGI programs to access internal databases through network routers, 
bypassing the firewall. It would seem that this would  negate the 
firewall. But if a router were to allow traffic only  between the 
exterior webserver and an internal database gateway and the 
communications between these two devices were confined to specific 
sockets (ports), then even if the external web server were compromised, 
it would be very difficult for an intruder to penetrate the internal 
database gateway (see diagram 2). 


                       Diagram 2.      CGI access between Web Server 
and DB Server

        This model would prohibit any access on the internet interface 
of the Web server, beyond http. This means that no telnet, ftp, or 
remote access could be achieved on the Web server. Further, the CGI 
interface would be compiled programs only.  No scripts would be 
allowed, because scripts require the usage of a shell program, which 
could allow external users to escape to the shell program. Once in the 
shell environment an external user could manipulate the shell command 
to commandeer the Web Server machine.

The router between the Web server and the DB server would allow only 
traffic between these two devices. Thus, even if the Web server were 
compromised, it would only be able to communicate with the DB Gateway. 

The DB gateway would provide its own CGI program that would 'talk' to 
the CGI program on the Web Server. This interface program would only 
talk on certain sockets and would establish it own OXY specific 
protocol procedure. This protocol would include an authentication 
algorithm designed to defeat access by outside users. Again there would 
be no UNIX script or equivalent usage. Had anyone penetrated the Web 
server, they would have to be aware of the protocol and its 
authentication algorithm to gain access to the DB server. The DB server 
would be a non UNIX box, that would not support ftp, telnet, or any 
remote unix access.   


Thanks,
Bill



______________________________ Reply Separator 
_________________________________
Subject: Securing Web data.
Author:  Brad Smith <brad @
 cse .
 ucsc .
 edu> at internetoxy
Date:    6/19/95 12:05 PM


Hello,

Is there any accepted wisdom for, or even first attempts at a solution 
to, resolving the conflict between wanting to put a Web server on the 
DMZ, outside of a firewall, and wanting to keep some of the data 
accessible via the Web server inside the firewall.
     
Based on my understanding of Web servers and firewalls, this conflict 
comes up when you have valuable data that you want to e.g. sell via 
the Web.  You don't want the Web server inside because it's difficult 
to really secure, but you don't want the data outside because it's not 
something you can throw to the wolves.
     
The one thought that comes to my mind is a mechanism that involves a 
simple file transfer protocol that is well authenticated and encrypted 
between the Web server machine and an internal machine... perhaps even 
a long-standing TCP connection that is setup when either host reboots.
     
Any answers, or corrections to my construction of the problem appreciated.
     
Brad Smith
Computer Sciences, UC Santa Cruz
brad @
 cis .
 ucsc .
 edu

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