Great Circle Associates Firewalls
(September 1995)
 

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Subject: Re: Firewall off Mortal Kombat XIV
From: gary flynn <gary @ habanero . jmu . edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 1995 10:48:17 -0400
To: firewalls-owner @ GreatCircle . COM, mjr @ iwi . com, sedayao @ argus . intel . com
Cc: firewalls @ GreatCircle . COM, hulveydb @ falcon . jmu . edu

> From: Ted Doty <ted @
 kgbvax .
 network .
 com>
> 
> sedayao @
 argus .
 intel .
 com (Jeffrey C. Sedayao) wrote:
> >  
> > > 	1) The notion of "network perimeter" will erode to the point
> > > 	where saying "protect all access into and out of your network"
> > > 	will be greeted with hysterical giggles. Right now when I
> > > 	say that many of my customers just look at me with a glazed
> > > 	eyed expression as if to say, "pull the other one."
> >  
> > I agree.  It is getting easier and easier for holes to be punched
> > through a large corporate "network perimeter".  In my opinion (and
> > unfortunate experience), insiders are probably the ones who will do 
> > the hole punching. 
> 
> Not necessarially.  Given the frequency of hacked phone switches, the
> security of an internal (say) Frame Relay wan is pretty suspect.  But
> insiders don't need to phreak to sniff the net.  You're right, tho ...
> the personnel department gets hacked much more often by insiders than
> by outsiders.
> 
> All in all, the "hard crunchy shell around the soft chewy center" is looking
> more an more like the Maginot Line.
> 
> > 2.  Individual applications and hosts will become more hardened and
> > secure.  For old applications, small individual sized "firewall-wrappers"
> > will become available.
> 
> At the risk of being Yet Another Security Pinhead, this is the Wrong
> Thing To Do.  If we think that the number of clueless boneheaded application
> developers is much larger than the number of clueless boneheaded kernel
> developers, then The Right Thing To Do is to put general security hooks in
> the kernel.
> 
> I'm fairly optimistic anout something like IPSec combined with TCP wrappers;
> IPSec prevents anonymity, and the wrappers give you a modicum of access
> control.  Let's fix it once (at the common - i.e. IP level), rather than
> having a million RFCs for "Privacy Enhanced Gopher".
> 

Isn't this what SecureWare's Hannah product does?

Can someone point me to a site that can tell me the progress of IPv6...
both the protocols and implementations?

thanks,

Gary Flynn
James Madison University

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From: Ted Doty <ted @ kgbvax . network . com>
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From: "Steven W. Lodin" <swlodin @ cs . purdue . edu>

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