Great Circle Associates Firewalls
(February 1996)
 

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Subject: Firewalls as we know them are dead meat ?? (Long)
From: johnd @ internet . netway . co . nz
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 1996 15:07:30 +1200 (NZT)
To: firewalls @ greatcircle . com

     In the course of my investigations re Instant Internet I've come 
     across a White Paper from Performance Technology which might be of 
     interest to readers of this list. For a full version see 
     http://www.perftech.com. Any comments about the demise of firewalls or 
     their appropriateness to Corporate LANS. Sorry about the length of the 
     quote but I felt it was necesssary to include as much as I have.
     
     You need to secure your computer network against break-ins just like 
     you secure your building against burglars.
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     However, the Internet firewall needs to permit authorized and 
     desirable operation to continue unimpeded.  A cascaded set of security 
     barriers can make using the Internet so uncomfortable and burdensome 
     that it becomes useless.
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     The more complicated a firewall becomes, the more necessary it is to 
     provide logging and audit trails of the events it has allowed, as well 
     as the events it has denied.  Using this log, a systems administrator 
     can track down attempts to bypass the security.  It also helps bring 
     attention to user problems resulting from overzealous constraints.  
     While some aspects of having such a log may seem positive, keeping it 
     functional may entail more than just reading it.  For example, it may 
     become necessary to write analytical programs to help automate the 
     investigation.
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     The simplest filters, such as those found in routers, limit the 
     permitted connections based upon specified clients connecting to 
     specified servers.  Just maintaining a list of these connections is 
     monstrous even in a modest sized LAN. 
     
     Another problem arises because the flexibility in protocols required 
     by popular browsing programs such as Mosaic, NetScape, and Winweb 
     makes such a list of questionable value.  The browsers often use UDP 
     datagrams instead of TCP/IP connections in internal operations like 
     those used in ARCHIE and  WAIS.  The relationship between the two ends 
     communicating through UDP datagrams is not structured into a client 
     and server as is communications under the connection conditions of 
     TCP/IP.  Therefore, a packets history is not self evident. 
     
     The problem has been tackled by filtering firewalls of amazing 
     complexity.  These firewalls are very expensive and run in very fast 
     and very expensive computers.  However, they do work.  They work by 
     tracking every user and knowing every permitted application.  They 
     follow the course of that application and scrutinize every packet to 
     see if it follows the rules put into the firewall.  There are lots of 
     rules and those rules are installed by the administrator.  The rules 
     are checked by the firewall filter for every packet.  A very fast 
     computer can make these checks for every single packet with only a 
     small deterioration performance. 
     
     Some installations have not just one, but two or more cascaded 
     firewalls to attempt guarantee of absolute security.  In some 
     installations, the ordinary network users are unable to access the 
     Internet because of this.
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     Typically, a proxy application firewall is taught each application 
     which local network users wish to run against the Internet.  The 
     mechanism works.  Since no IP packets can travel from the Internet to 
     the local network, the intruders have a very hard time invading.  
     However, since the proxy application must be taught each application, 
     it may be very limited in the number of users it can support.  
     Clearly, new applications may not be introduced to the LAN users on a 
     timely basis.
     
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     Instant Internet:  Security by means of total IP blocking
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     By contrast, Instant Internet allows IPX workstations on your local 
     LAN running IP to access the Internet without any IP traffic traveling 
     between the Internet and the local IP LAN.  While IP continues to run 
     on the LAN, IP traffic from the Internet is blocked by the Instant 
     Internet box.  All incoming Internet packets stop at the Instant 
     Internet box, therefore outsiders cannot penetrate the LAN.  Instant 
     Internet is effectively hiding the local IP LAN including the IP 
     addresses and configurations.  Your network remains secure.  What's 
     more, no changes to the local network are required in order to use 
     Instant Internet.
     
     
     John Dobson 



Follow-Ups:
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From: Bjorn Satdeva <bjorn @ sysadmin . com>
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From: Paul Ferguson <pferguso @ cisco . com>
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From: Pete Lancashire <petel @ seikotsi . com>
Next: Re: Firewalls as we know them are dead meat ?? (Long)
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