Great Circle Associates Firewalls
(March 1996)
 

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Subject: SunScreen
From: Norm Laudermilch <norm_laudermilch @ tds . com>
Organization: Trident Data Systems
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 08:59:43 -0700
To: firewalls @ greatcircle . com
Cc: ckostick @ csc . com

Chris Kostick wrote about SunScreen:

> I can't say I like the fact it is totally a blackbox.

Well, there are good and bad points to this, and you've pointed out only 
the bad ones.  First, being transparent (and having no ip 
addresses on the filtering interfaces) makes it very hard to detect, 
attack, and compromise from a malicious perspective.  This is one area 
where many of the current firewall products fail.  They build a nice 
packet filtering and/or proxy layer on top of a fully functioning unix 
platform.  Then you rely solely on the installer/administrator to secure 
the OS before installing and configuring the firewall software.  As we 
know, this can be a daunting task for the security impaired. 

Second, being basically a 4 port ethernet hub makes the SS very easy to 
install into an existing environment.  Most organizations have a hub 
hooked directly off of their internet (or other untrusted network) 
router anyway, so the SS just fits in between. 

Third, being transparent makes it simple to integrate from a user 
perspective.  Humans resist change, and any time you add another level 
of complexity for Susie accessing www.wasteoftime.com you're asking for 
trouble.  God forbid Susie be a manager, and your firewall funding gets 
cut off.  Traditionally, this was the benefit of packet filtering 
firewalls over application level gateway firewalls.  But that benefit is 
now becoming void with "transparent" proxies from TIS, Raptor, etc.  
With a transparent solution, Susie doesn't even know that her 
packets have passed through a perimeter security device, been 
authenticated, encrypted, (mangled), or whatever.  Anyway, just a few 
observations.

> I like to be able to see what's going on with the machine and, as
> a manager, interrogate it any way I please. You don't have that
> option with sunscreen.

Actually, you can interrogate the SunScreen from a management 
perspective very easily.  In the SunScreen Administration application on 
the admin station, double click on the name of the SunScreen to 
establish an encrypted connection to it.  When the SS screen appears, go 
to the "Miscellaneous" tab on the GUI and type "help" in the "Get 
Special Information" field.  You will be presented with a list of legal 
commands to send to the SS.  These commands will allow you to retrieve 
all kinds of OS information.  Of course, there are also the other 9 tabs 
of information and statistics to look at if you're interested as well.

The SunScreen device itself is designed to coexist peacefully with your 
comm equipment and never really be touched by human hands (other than 
initial configuration).  Much like a router, CSU, etc, the SS only has 
idiot lights on the front panel and must be interrogated by the admin 
station to get detailed operating stats.  Again, just like a router, 
CSU, etc.  It's just a different philosophy than say a firewall 
application running on a unix box.  In that case you'd expect a directly 
connected keyboard, mouse, monitor, etc to be your interface to finding 
out what's up.  Not so with comm gear, or with the SunScreen.

Norm

Norm Laudermilch
Trident Data Systems
norm_laudermilch @
 tds .
 com

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