I know this is dragging out and way off topic;, therefore, this is my
last list mailing on this topic. Anyone that wants to continue this
discussion, please mail direct.
Alvaro Redondo <merlin @
sevillaonline .
com> writes:
> I thought this was a professional discuss listing. I never imagined that sayi
> ng 'connect to the POP server using telnet' was going to bring so many proble
> ms.
>
> And when I said that, I was thinking about the end-user, the owner of the mai
> lbox.
It does bring problems, but not with the people that you think it does.
You can't just tell the end-user, someone that is using a windows based
product that all they know is point and click, to telnet to the port
and delete their messages on POP-RFC commands. They'll just stare at you,
at least the majority of users in all of the sites that I have been involved
with.
As a professional, I have to come up with solutions that are more reasonable
from the users stand point. This solution does nothing but confuse the
people that don't understand how connections and commands work.
> Of course that telneting to the account doesn't solve the problem that the ma
> ilbox was already full and that person couldn't have all his/her messages rec
> eived. I only gave a reason because mail-bombing sends many small messages in
> stead of a few big ones.
>
> Also if someone doesn't know how to connect using telnet to erase the message
> s without having to download them, and downloads the messages, it takes more
> time to download many small messages instead of a few big ones (the total siz
> e of the mailbox is the same).
That point is not at issue. I understand the implications of mailbombing
with large and small messages. My sole purpose of responding at all is to
inform you that your solutions for end-users is not adequate. I could
telnet to ports and fix things until my hands fall off, but the users
will not be able to, in most cases. That's all.
>
> Finally, I don't think that a mail-bombing, by itself, can damage a mail serv
> er (it would be a shame for the administrator), not even when you are trying
> to decrease the flood of that server (there are better technics). Maybe in co
> njuction with other systems.
Mailbombing in and of itself is quite damaging. Even if there are mail
quotas for individual users, it still causes loss of time, not only
because mail might not have been received, but there is the problem of
fixing the filled mailboxes, regardless if the administrator or the user
does it. These costs, while they maybe quantified in terms of dollar amounts
can be staggering, especially if the mailbombing does effect everyone in
the department or enterprise. Imagine if you will a company that is quite
email-centric, and the mailserver gets bombed and all spool space is filled.
While you might think that your time to clean this up is only an hour, big
deal, but the fact that other mail is waiting to get in, some of which
being important, and it takes time to begin spooling again, etc. Let's say
that it takes 4 hours for full operational status to be regained. If there
are 1000 people effected, that is 4000 people hours of lost time. Take that
number and estimate peoples hourly worth to somewhere around 15 (an
average of something like 40,000 a year) and multiply. 4000x15 = $60,000
That is a lot of cash to waste on a small twit out there firing emails
at a corporation. Now that was all hypothetical, but you understand where
things like DoS attacks can lead?
-Ken Wilcox
References:
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