Great Circle Associates Firewalls
(June 1997)
 

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Subject: Firewalls, Spooks, $3,000 and Proving the null hypothesis
From: Richard Jones <richard @ a42 . deep-thought . org>
Date: Tue, 01 Jul 1997 01:40:41 +1000
To: norm @ uu . net
Cc: firewalls @ greatcircle . com
In-reply-to: Your message of "Mon, 30 Jun 1997 07:35:53 -0400." <33B79A19 . 15FB7483 @ uu . net>

> As much as I hated to contribute one single keystroke to this thread,
> I couldn't help stating one thing:

me also. ;)


[snipped response from well known firewall producer]

> 
> If you'd just give us the source code, we'd be able to verify things
> just fine.  I don't want to hear any whining about the fact that it 
> would compromise your intellectual property or anything like that,
> because there are sufficient legal restrictions you could use to
> protect yourself.  Just give us the source code, and we'll be happy.
> 
> As security people, we should be careful about trusting anything without
> source code anyway..
> 


Two points:

1/
This very quickly becomes circular, 
Customer:"We don't trust you, so lets see the source code."
Firewall Manufacturer: "Ok...Here's the source code"
Customer:"But hang on this has no back-doors, show me the *real* source code."
Firewall Manufacturer: "*sigh*"

I spose you could build from the source and use the resulting binary to target suspect areas of your "official" binary, but I guess different compilation environments could explain differences.

2/
Say you don't get source, say you disassemble the whole thing and find no code that pops up with "<3-letter-agency> Hole Authorisation. Please enter code",  instead you find an overflow which allows the insertion of arbitrary code, of arbitrary length.  Now, assuming the 3-letter-agency is doing their job right they will go for the second option.  So you think MJR will cough up the 3 big ones for that? Maybe..maybe not.  So bottom line is, short of a press-release from the 3-letter-agency or the company involved it would appear very very hard to prove deliberate compromise.  This is relevant to any producer of similar products I would think.


Richard.






Follow-Ups:
References:
Indexed By Date Previous: secure replication of data in insecure networks
From: Miguel Andrés Santisteban <masantis @ ntmail . askin . es>
Next: Re: Firewall vs "/etc/hosts.deny"
From: "Daniel G. Drumm" <dgd @ nebula . is . rpslmc . edu>
Indexed By Thread Previous: Auditing Firewall Product Source Code
From: Kent Landfield <kent @ landfield . com>
Next: Re: Firewalls, Spooks, $3,000 and Proving the null hypothesis
From: Adam Shostack <adam @ homeport . org>

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