>>>>> "JVE" == John Van Essen <vanes002@umn.edu> writes:
JVE> Maybe mention that the owner must be a valid email address or a
JVE> comma-separated list of such addresses and that the @hostname part can
JVE> be omitted for accounts on the machine from which mj2 delivers mail.
But that's not an accurate description of the command.
The address must of course be valid. A comma-separated list is not
accepted. You cannot eliminate the hostname unless you have configured the
address validator to allow such addresses, which isn't quite a novice
setting and is a bit beyond the scope of that help text. A separate help
text on addresses might mention it.
Note that the provided address appears nowhere in the generated aliases.
It only affects the default setting of the 'owners' variable, which takes
an array of addresses.
JVE> Also, does each list have an 'owners' sublist defining its owners?
Not a sublist, but an array of variables.
JVE> Auxwho doesn't have an optional [regexp] argument. Shouldn't it have
JVE> one to be consistent?
Once I write it, sure. He's documenting what is there now.
JVE> For regexps, substitute all @'s with \@, unconditionally.
I don't agree. Is it a perl regular expression or not? Now they can't
look in a perl manual either. And if I, being a knowledgeable Perl
programmer, actually escape the '@' like I'm supposed to, I get an error.
That is extremely bad; now people who know how Mj1 works are all of a
sudden generating bad regexps. Surely you can't intend this.
JVE> Also, since arbitrary statements can be interpolated into a string,
JVE> maybe escape {'s that follow a $. For example, this 'string' example
JVE> will cause the date to be printed with no return to perl:
No, it will result in a failed match and a logged message about an
unpermitted operation trapped in a Safe compartment. No regexp comparisons
happen out of a Safe compartment.
JVE> would that have the "intended effect" in majordomo2?
No, you cannot exploit Mj2 in that way, unless you find a way to avoid the
security of a Safe compartment. Also note this question from the FAQ
included with the distribution:
Is Majordomo 2 secure?
It should be more secure than 1.94.x is. Majordomo affords trust to
neither users nor list owners. There is only a single "eval" call, which
is used to evaluate the defaults provided by someone with enough access
to edit the files themselves. All other code evaluation happens within
Perl's Safe mechanism. The Safe mechanism has yet to be broken.
(Is this the first Mj2 RTFF?)
- J<
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